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3. AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP LAW 
AGENCY LAW 
Pearlie KOH 
LLB (Hons) (National University of Singapore),  
LLM (University of Melbourne); Advocate and Solicitor (Singapore);  
Associate Professor, School of Law, Singapore Management University. 
Creation of agency 
3.1 In Yong Sheng Goldsmith Pte Ltd v Liberty Insurance Pte Ltd 
[2011] SGHC 156, an insurance agent who was registered with the 
defendant insurers was held to be the latter’s agent for the purposes of 
the plaintiff ’s insurance policy with the defendant. Accordingly, the 
defendant, as principal, could properly be imputed with the knowledge 
of its agent. 
3.2 The issue arose in the context of a claim by the plaintiff on  
a contract of insurance it had entered into with the defendant. The 
defendant had attempted to repudiate the policy on the basis of material 
non-disclosure by the plaintiff. The plaintiff had, in fact, communicated 
the material information to one Johnny, the insurance agent who had 
been handling, since 2003, all matters relating to the plaintiff ’s policy 
with the defendant, including its procurement and subsequent renewals. 
The defendant denied that Johnny was its agent, claiming instead that he 
was the agent for the plaintiff as he had placed policies for the plaintiff 
with other insurance companies. The court rejected this submission, 
holding that the evidence (which included a valid name card issued by 
the defendant) clearly showed Johnny to be the agent of the defendant 
with authority to procure and put into effect insurance policies. In the 
circumstances, the communication by the plaintiff of the material 
information to Johnny was akin to a communication to the defendant, 
so that Johnny’s knowledge constituted the defendant’s knowledge. That 
Johnny did not in fact communicate the information to the defendant 
was held to be irrelevant to the issue. 
Holding out and apparent authority 
3.3 It is an established principle of agency law that an agent cannot 
“self-authorise” or create his own appearance of authority (see Armagas 
Ltd v Mundogas SA (The Ocean Frost) [1986] AC 717 (“The Ocean 
Frost”). This principle appears to have been circumvented by the English 
Court of Appeal in First Energy (UK) Ltd v Hungarian International 
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Bank Ltd [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 194 (“First Energy”) which held that an 
agent who had no actual or apparent authority to conclude, on his 
principal’s behalf, the transaction itself, may nevertheless have the 
apparent authority to represent that the principal had approved and 
concluded that transaction: The Ocean Frost at 779. The effect of this 
apparent authority is that the principal is similarly bound. Given the 
“razor-edge thinness” (G McMeel, “Philosophical Foundations of the 
Law of Agency” (2000) 116 LQR 387 at 405) of the distinction between 
this case and that of the House of Lords in The Ocean Frost, it is  
not surprising that the decision has not been universally embraced  
(see, eg, C H Tan, The Law of Agency (Singapore: Academy Publishing, 
2010) at [05.043]; cf I Brown, “The Agent’s Apparent Authority: 
Paradigm or Paradox?” (1995) Journal of Business Law at 360). In 
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (Publ), Singapore Branch v Asia 
Pacific Breweries (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2011] 3 SLR 540 (“Skandinaviska”), 
the Court of Appeal had occasion to consider the principle laid down in 
First Energy. 
3.4 The issue before the court in Skandinaviska was whether the 
defendant company, APBS, was bound by certain acts of its employee. 
Chia, who held the title of “finance manager”, had managed to obtain 
credit and loan facilities from the plaintiff banks, purportedly for the 
company’s purposes. This was, however, part of a scheme to defraud the 
banks of large sums of money which Chia effected by providing the 
banks with forged documents, including forged resolutions of the APBS 
board. The banks claimed against APBS for the repayment of these sums 
on the basis, inter alia, that Chia had actual or ostensible authority to 
enter into the relevant transactions on APBS’s behalf. The claims failed 
in the High Court before Belinda Ang Saw Ean J ([2009] 4 SLR(R) 788). 
Her Honour held that any actual authority Chia may have been granted 
would have been vitiated by his fraud and that, on the evidence, as APBS 
had not held Chia out as having the authority to transact as he did, the 
claim on apparent authority also necessarily failed. 
3.5 On appeal in Skandinaviska, counsel for the banks submitted 
that her Honour ought to have accorded more weight to First Energy, 
which, it was argued, demonstrated the inadequacies of the orthodox 
doctrine of apparent authority in situations where the principal was an 
“impersonal corporate structure”: First Energy at [37]. The focus of the 
court’s inquiry therefore, ought not to have been whether there was an 
unequivocal representation by the principal to the third party, but 
should instead have shifted to “the reasonable expectations of the third 
party as they would objectively appear in the context of commercial 
convenience and modern-day dealings”: First Energy at [37]. It was, 
therefore, submitted that Chia, being the most senior finance officer  
in APBS, had the authority, whether actual or apparent, to make 
representations on APBS’s behalf, including the representations that 
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APBS had accepted the facilities and that the forged documents were 
genuine and the transactions ought, therefore, to be binding on APBS. 
3.6 The Court of Appeal, however, agreed with the High Court 
judge that the evidence did not show that APBS had held Chia out as 
possessing actual and/or apparent authority to make the representations 
as asserted. Of First Energy, Chan Sek Keong CJ (who delivered the 
judgment of the court) stated (Skandinaviska at [51]): 
[T]he court’s decision [in First Energy] was based on a specific finding 
of fact that the principal concerned had held out its agent as having 
authority to make, in relation to the transaction in question, 
representations of the class or kind of representations that the agent 
actually made, even though the agent knew he had no actual authority 
to enter into the transaction itself. [emphasis added] 
3.7 In First Energy, the defendant bank had granted wide ranging 
authority to the branch manager in Manchester to perform a variety of 
tasks. Therefore, although the manager had no authority to grant a loan 
(as was made clear to the bank’s customer), he was nevertheless found 
to possess the authority to convey the bank’s approval of the loan to the 
customer. The present case was different as, in the Court of Appeal’s 
view, Chia was “merely the finance manager of APBS, a title which does 
not connote the possession of any specific authority”: Skandinaviska 
at [51]. The court further observed that a representation by an agent 
that his principal had approved a transaction “[went] to the heart of the 
agency relationship” (Skandinaviska at [59]), as it effectively conferred 
on the agent transactional authority. Therefore, whilst an agent may have 
the authority to make general representations about the transaction, this 
cannot include the authority to make the specific representation that  
the principal had approved the transaction, as this would be contrary to 
the principle, established in The Ocean Frost, that there cannot be  
self-authorisation by the agent. The position was different if the agent 
had in fact been conferred the authority, whether actual or ostensible, to 
make that specific representation, as was the case in First Energy. 
3.8 The banks had also provided evidence which showed that Chia 
had unlimited authority to operate a genuine account that APBS held 
with another bank, that he had authority to open fixed deposit accounts 
in APBS’s name, that he frequently dealt with banks and acted as the 
point of communication between APBS and its bankers and that he had 
wide powers with respect to APBS’s facilities and properties. The Court 
of Appeal was, however, in agreement with the High Court that the 
evidence was insufficient to show that Chia was vested with the 
authority to make the representations asserted. In the court’s view, Chia, 
being only a “finance manager” of one company in a large corporate 
group, was vested with much less general authority than someone in the 
position of a general manager, a finance director or a managing director. 
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In the circumstances, therefore, the banks’ appeal on the point of 
apparent authority, must necessarily fail. 
3.9 After taking note of the various criticisms that have been made 
of the decision in First Energy, Chan CJ opined that the case may not in 
fact be consistent with established authority, and, may instead be a 
radical departure from the traditional conceptual basis of the doctrine 
of apparent authority. As such, his Honour cautioned as follows 
(Skandinaviska at [57]): 
[I]f it becomes necessary in a future case for a Singapore court to 
decide whether or not First Energy is good law in this country, the 
court will have to first identify in so far as is possible, what principle 
(if any) was established in First Energy that is not … inconsistent with 
[The Ocean Frost]. 
PARTNERSHIP LAW 
Stephen BULL 
BA, LLB (Hons) (Wellington), LLM (Harvard);  
Solicitor (England and Wales), Barrister and Solicitor (New Zealand), 
Member of the New York Bar;  
Associate Professor (Practice), School of Law, Singapore Management 
University. 
Relationship of partners between themselves 
Breach of duty 
3.10 In Ang Tin Gee v Pang Teck Guan [2011] SGHC 259 (“Ang Tin 
Gee”), the plaintiff (“Julie”) and the defendant (“Andy”) in 1996 formed 
a partnership known as Japco TC International Enterprise (“Japco”). 
The firm’s business was initially the export of electrical appliances. 
Andy, who claimed to have some expertise and experience in the field, 
was the primary manager while Julie’s main role was to provide funding. 
Overdraft finance was also obtained from United Overseas Bank 
(“UOB”), secured by a mortgage on Julie’s residence and by joint and 
several guarantees. However, after a major default by a customer in  
the Seychelles, losses were sustained on the appliances export business, 
and eventually the firm moved into the domestic supply of office 
consumables instead. A business called Office Consumables Supplies 
(“OCS”) was registered in 2000. Thereafter, Japco, in effect, operated as 
the purchasing arm and OCS as the sales arm of the operation. Andy 
was in charge of both aspects. The partnership continued to accumulate 
losses and was ultimately dissolved in 2006 at the instance of Julie, who 
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subsequently brought a claim against Andy alleging breaches of his duty 
as partner and seeking an equitable account. 
3.11 The principal issues concerned (a) the financial terms on which 
the partnership was based; (b) whether OCS was a partnership business 
at all; and (c) if it was, whether it had been operated by Andy for the 
benefit of the firm. While most of the key issues of fact were disputed by 
the parties, Belinda Ang Saw Ean J preferred the evidence of Julie in 
almost all respects. 
3.12 The court concluded that the partnership was based on equal 
sharing of capital, profits and losses. The partnership agreement, 
apparently made without legal input, referred (in cl 2) to “capital to be 
maintained at S$250,000 in 3 years’ time for equal partnership 
purposes” and (in cl 3) to Andy receiving a monthly salary and annual 
bonus “with profit sharing of 10% after net P & L. Profit sharing ceiling 
at 25%, thereafter subject to further discussion”. While Julie paid in 
capital of S$125,000 over time, Andy never in fact contributed any 
capital. Nevertheless, Ang J held (Ang Tin Gee at [62]–[68]), that the 
foregoing agreement contemplated that Andy’s share would be 
capitalised from his share of net profits (if any), over three years on a 
catch-up (or “earn-in”) basis. Therefore, his true entitlement was 50% of 
the profits, but with up to 40% of the profits being capitalised to satisfy 
his capital obligation. Moreover, a 50% profit share was consistent with 
the 50:50 allocation repeatedly stated in the partnership tax returns. 
Applying the presumption in s 24(1) of the Partnership Act (Cap 391, 
1994 Rev Ed), losses would be shared equally, ie, on the same basis as 
profits. Andy would, therefore, be liable to indemnify Julie for half of the 
outstanding UOB overdraft: Ang Tin Gee at [120]. 
3.13 OCS had been registered as a sole proprietorship in Andy’s 
name. Although he argued that this fact indicated that OCS was his 
separate business rather than part of the Japco partnership, the court 
held (with respect, correctly) that it was not conclusive. The evidence 
showed that Japco had funded OCS’s start-up costs and all its 
operational expenses, eg, rent and utilities for the common premises, 
without reimbursement. Further, Japco in effect financed OCS’s 
inventory by purchasing for cash and on-selling to OCS on credit. 
Moreover, there was no proper system of invoicing between Japco and 
OCS. All of these points went to indicate that they were not separate 
businesses, but were in fact managed by Andy as components of the 
same business: Ang Tin Gee at [80]. In addition, as the judge pointed out 
(Ang Tin Gee at [69]), even if Japco and OCS were separately owned 
businesses, Andy’s use of Japco’s resources in OCS’s business without 
proper disclosure to Julie would have amounted to misappropriation of 
Japco’s money. 
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3.14 Given the conclusion that OCS was part of the partnership’s 
business, Andy’s fiduciary obligation was to manage OCS for the firm’s 
benefit and account for its transactions. His failure to account properly 
for the usage of Japco’s resources, and his retention of OCS’s profits, 
gave rise to breaches of his fiduciary duty: Ang Tin Gee at [96], [103] 
and [106]. In view of the unreliability of the OCS figures produced by 
Andy for the trial, various accounts were ordered to determine the 
amount payable to Julie. 
3.15 However, the court dismissed Julie’s claim against Andy in 
negligence founded on the default of the Seychelles customer (see 
para 3.10 above). Even where a business loss is attributable primarily to 
one partner, his co-partners do not have a claim against him unless he 
has committed fraud, culpable negligence (apparently meaning “gross” 
negligence: Tann v Herrington [2009] EWHC 445) or wilful default, 
none of which had been made out: Ang Tin Gee at [141]. 
Dissolution of partnership 
Effect of retirement 
3.16 Ang Tin Yong v Ang Boon Chye [2012] 1 SLR 447 (“Ang Tin 
Yong”) involved a short point on the effect of the retirement of two  
of the partners in a firm operating a food centre. The history was  
that the partnership had previously under-declared its income to the 
Inland Revenue, resulting in all the partners receiving additional tax 
assessments. The respondents in this appeal had then brought 
proceedings against the appellant claiming that, as they had entrusted 
the entire management of the partnership to him, he was liable to them 
for the additional tax. In those proceedings (reported at [2008] 
SGHC 177), an account was ordered to be taken of the firm’s business 
for 1999–2004, and the respondents in 2008 obtained an assistant 
registrar’s order (“AR’s Order”) requiring the appellant to produce the 
account. After he had failed to do so, the respondents in 2010 sought 
leave to bring committal proceedings against him for contempt. The 
appellant, however, pleaded that in 2009 the respondents had executed a 
deed with the other partners (“Deed”) under which they had retired 
from the firm, and, therefore, they lacked locus standi to seek leave for 
committal. Although the High Court granted the respondents leave to 
proceed, this was overturned on appeal. 
3.17 Under the Deed, the respondents had, in consideration for  
a payment of S$150,000 each, assigned “all [their] share and interest … 
in the goodwill debts and credits and all property of … [the partners]  
in connection with the partnership” to the continuing partners. 
Construing the Deed in the light of its clear object and with commercial 
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common sense, the Court of Appeal had little difficulty in finding that 
the respondents had settled their claims and retired from the 
partnership, ceasing to have any interest in its assets and accounts. 
Accordingly, their interest in enforcing the AR’s Order no longer existed. 
The court, moreover, held that it was an implied term of the Deed that 
the AR’s Order would be extinguished upon the respondents being paid 
out. For them to seek, one year later, to enforce that order amounted to 
bad faith and an abuse of process. It is of course possible for outgoing 
partners to preserve claims against their partners after retirement; it 
depends upon the terms of the retirement. In this case the court held 
that it was plain that the Deed was intended to effect a clean break. 
 
